- Hypocrisy of Prejudice: Power of Hope by Wan Lenox
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Conversely, participants who belonged to, or were primed to identify with, a majority ethnic group were more likely to advocate a proportional distribution of procedural resources. In line with these findings, Louis and Taylor advocated a relativist advocated of human rights, highlighting that affordance of rights varies across contexts, time, the social groups people belong to, and the social identities they espouse.
People interpret human rights relative to their ingroup, and so the interpretation is affected by the group's status position within the societal hierarchy see also Worchel, By implication, people also have multiple outgroups toward whom their endorsement of human rights may also vary. This suggests that inconsistency in rights endorsements could arise because different ingroup-outgroup relationships involve different frames of comparison.
It seems to us that the universalist Doise et al. Kymlicka, positions can be reconciled. There could be a universal conceptualization of human rights, but these principles can be applied differently due to the hierarchical nature of human societies, and the intergroup relations they embody. Therefore, we consider that people's endorsement of the value of equality may not translate into application to specific groups, because social identities, power hierarchies, and. Empirically, individuals in Western societies generally support the abstract goal of human rights.
McFarland and Mathews argue that this may reflect social desirability concerns because endorsement of rights is an essential part of North American, and more generally Western, ideology. The researchers found that when comparing people's preference for human rights versus national self-interest goals, "promoting and defending human rights in other countries" was ranked only as 12th out of 15 goals.
This reveals that individuals may preach human rights more than they are prepared to practice them, at least when choosing between the importance of global rights versus national priorities. Adolescents who valued human rights highly judged sanctions that violated human rights to be less acceptable when applied to a murderer than to a pedophile rapist, when applied to a thief than to a drug dealer, and when applied to "handicapped" children rather than to immigrant children.
In studies using minimal groups, Maio, Hahn, Frost, and Cheung showed that varying the situational salience of equality values could also affect whether they were applied to resource distribution between groups. Support for the human right to equality logically implies support for equality for everyone regardless of their race, gender, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, age, and physical ability.
Despite evidence that many people agree with the notion that all human beings should be treated equally, research on intergroup prejudice leads us to expect that, when asked more concretely, people will differentiate which groups most "deserve" these rights, thereby revealing equality hypocrisy. Specifically, equality hypocrisy occurs when. We believe that equality hypocrisy is inherent in many, possibly all societies.
The present study explores its forms and possible influences in the United Kingdom—a country that is usually regarded as relatively modern, progressive and liberal. People's ingroup commitment might simply mean that they view all outgroups as less deserving than the ingroup.
Potential intergroup competition may motivate people to deny equality to groups that are viewed as competing with the ingroup either ideologically or materially. Moreover, people may garner positive ingroup distinctiveness, self-esteem and competitive superiority by ensuring that lower status groups are not afforded the same "rights" as a majority ingroup. This is surprising given that most people live in societies that do present multiple outgroup categories. Research has shown that the personal and social motivations to control prejudice strongly predict its expression toward specific outgroups e.
People who are high in internal motivation to control prejudice show lower prejudice in public as well as pri-. People low in internal motivation but high in external motivation to control prejudice only show lower prejudice in public, but not in private, contexts. For example, Legault, Gutsell, and Inzlicht showed that, compared to a control condition, when people were primed with autonomous motivation to regulate prejudice i.
Although motivation to control prejudice is compatible with advocacy of equality, and although a liberal interpretation of such motivation is that it is consistent with a free and fair society, these concepts are not necessarily synonymous. For example, it is possible to envisage that someone could be unconcerned about their own prejudice but still advocate the principle of equality for all, perhaps for religious, moral, or material reasons. Moreover, it is plausible that someone who is highly motivated not to be prejudiced could still be perfectly willing to accept that society should tolerate inequality.
Finally, someone whose primary concern is not to appear prejudiced may be motivated either because they value equality or because they prefer inequality but do not wish to be seen to do so. Whether these motivations to control prejudice similarly affect the ascription of rights to different types of group, and whether they do so independently of equality values, are interesting and unexplored questions in both inter-group relations and human rights research. Why might we expect uneven affordance of equality to different minority groups? Different societal groups are perceived and stereotyped differently.
The combination of these two primary characteristics gives rise to the perceived stereotypicality of groups and to differential qualities of prejudice. Thus, groups. Groups that are considered low in warmth but high in competence are on the receiving end of envy and envious prejudice e. Groups that are considered low in both competence and in warmth elicit contempt e. Of course, there are various blends of moderate levels of these qualities, forming a middle cluster. Numerous studies have demonstrated that different groups are evaluated in terms of the warmth-competence stereotype dimensions, which in turn informs people's emotional and behavioral reactions toward these groups e.
For the purposes of this research we examine whether participants assign the human right of equality differentially to different status minorities as a function of the evaluative implications of stereotypes associated with these groups. We expect status minority groups that are known to be stereotyped as warmer but less competent hence paternalized will be judged differently from status minorities that are stereotyped as colder, or potentially more threatening hence not paternalized.
In , the U. Labour government prepared to merge the roles of distinctive commissions e. To better understand the implications of this merger, the Women and Equality Unit within the Department for Trade and Industry for the "Equalities Review" commissioned and conducted this research, which provided part of the foundation for establishing the Equality and Human Rights Commission The Equalities Review, It was the first single piece of integrated U. This provided a unique opportunity to discover how, across a whole population, views about the rights of these distinct groups would relate to overall values about key human rights.
Paternalistic stereotypes depict social groups as pitied and instigate feelings of compassion and sympathy and a desire to help these needy groups. Paternalized groups are those that are targets of "benevolent" prejudice, which accords those groups low status and competence but relatively high levels of warmth. As a result they are treated as dependent and needy, deserving of sympathy, but are effectively pinned to low status and power positions.
The dilemma for these groups is that they lose the "benefits" of patronage and charity if they challenge for higher status positions. Such prejudice is by no means benign. Based on the stereotype content model Fiske et al. In contrast, Black, Muslim, and gay people were expected to pose various types of threat culturally or materially and as liable to be viewed as competitors vis-a-vis majority White British society.
Thus, we classified these as nonpaternalized groups. We hypothesized that the representative sample would assign equal rights more readily to paternalized than to nonpaternalized groups. The present research examines how equality values and motivation to control prejudice relate to equality. We examine the following issues in relation to judgments involving women, people over 70, disabled people, gay and lesbian people, Muslims, and Black people. If, on average, people in society claim to value equality as a universal right more than they are willing to attach importance to the wishes and equality of opportunity for specific social groups this suggests that the society manifests what we term equality hypocrisy.
The hypocrisy arises because valuing equality more highly for some groups than others is logically incompatible with valuing universal equality.dbctech.in/141-zithromax-antibiotic.php
Hypocrisy of Prejudice: Power of Hope by Wan Lenox
Societal hypocrisy could exist because all individuals favor certain groups more than others. However, these average societal differences do not reveal a further aspect of equality hypocrisy—some individuals may differentiate levels of importance they attach to the equality rights of different groups more than other individuals do.
That is, individuals may differ in the extent to which they show equality inconsistency. Such inconsistency is potentially hypocritical because it seems perverse to advocate greater equality for some groups at the expense of others. Therefore we consider the extent to which individuals attach different importance to satisfying the wishes, and ensuring equal employment opportunities for each group equality inconsistency.
We propose that, matching the societal level differences, individuals' equality inconsistency will expose a contrast between paternalized and nonpaternalized groups, whereby the latter are liable to be regarded as less deserving of equality. We examine a measure of prejudice in the context of employment: expressions of comfort in having a boss who is from each minority group a specific form of social distance; Bog-. Because of their common link in terms of intergroup relations, we expect equality inconsistency to be mirrored by a similar pattern of preferences in social distance.
We also investigate the extent to which equality inconsistency and prejudice are predictable from an individual's support for the value of equality and their internal and external motivation to control prejudice. In summary, we expect that while people may agree with the general value of equality they may not support equality equally for all minority groups equality hypocrisy. Furthermore, on the basis of intergroup relations theory we expect that people may place higher value on equality for paternalized than nonpaternal-ized groups equality inconsistency. We expect that the gap in importance attached to equality for paternalized versus nonpaternalized groups should be lower among individuals who value equality for all, and who are internally or externally motivated to control prejudice.
The sample comprised 1, men The majority of participants Furthermore, the majority of participants Of the participants, To keep the survey to a manageable length, and because we had high statistical power due to sample size, three versions of the survey were administered to separate nationally representative samples each comprising approximately 1, respondents. All versions included measures of equality values, measures of the importance of equality, and motivation to control prejudice, but the different versions included specific questions about opportunities and social distance for two target groups only.
Specifically, each version asked about one group that we considered subject to paternalistic prejudice and one that was more likely to be subject to traditional nonpaternalistic prejudice. Version A asked these questions in relation to women and homosexuals, Version B asked these questions in relation to people over 70 and Muslims, and Version C asked these questions in relation to disabled people and Black people.
Left- and right-scale anchor points were counterbalanced between participants e.
Equality value. Participants were asked to rate their agreement with the statement, "There should be equality for all groups in Britain. Motivations to control prejudice. We used two items to measure internal and external motivation to control prejudice. These were se-. The items were the highest loading items on the internal and external factors from Plant and Devine's scales. Participants were told, "People sometimes make an effort not to be prejudiced.
To what extent would you disagree or agree that each of the following reasons describes your view? Group rights. Participants were informed, "Not all groups in society want the same thing as the majority. How important do you feel it is that the particular wishes of each of the following groups is satisfied? The response options were 1 not at all important , 2 not very important , 3 neither important nor unimportant , 4 quite important , or 5 very important.
Group equality. Participants were asked to tick a box to indicate whether they believed "attempts to give equal employment opportunities to [relevant minority group, depending on version] in this country have gone too far or not far enough? Social distance. The measure of social distance gauges respondents' anticipated emotional responses to varying levels of closeness toward members of different target groups. Depending on version, participants were asked, "How comfortable or uncomfortable do you think you would feel if a suitably qualified [target group person] was appointed as your boss?
To some extent this measure may also tap respondents' willingness to work for members of the relevant social group, and therefore has. Correlation analyses revealed some significant but small relationships between participants' equality value or motivations to control prejudice on the one hand and gender, ethnicity, age, religion whether Muslim , sexual orientation whether heterosexual , but not disability, on the other see Table 1.
To adjust for the relationships in subsequent analyses all demographic variables were included as covariates. Our first goal was to establish whether there was evidence of equality hypocrisy. We examined the percentage of respondents who selected each response option for the equality values item and the group rights items.
Equality hypocrisy can be evaluated statistically by comparing the mean responses of equality value levels with mean levels of group rights and group equality for specific groups. Because the response scales for equality value and the other measures differ, we are cautious about making direct comparisons, but they seem meaningful to the extent that the highest score for all measures 5 reflects a high priority for equality, whereas a midscale score reflects a neutral preference.
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Compared with equality value, respondents judged the group rights of paternalized groups to be closer to the maximum, whereas they judged the group rights of nonpaternalized groups to be further from the maximum. Thus, some respondents clearly do not attach equal importance to the rights of different groups. Overall, these descriptive differences show clearly that people's willingness to espouse equality as a value is greater than their willingness to ascribe the same rights and equality to different groups.
N Internal motivation to control prejudice External motivation to control prejudice Equality value. Figure 1. Means for strength of endorsement of the value of universal equality "equality for all groups" and of importance of the rights and advocacy of greater equality of opportunity for specific groups. Higher means represent stronger endorsement. The equality value response scale is from strongly disagree to strongly agree; the group rights scale is from not at all important to extremely important; the group equality scale is from gone much too far to not gone nearly far enough. Error bars depict standard errors.
The group rights data indicate equality hypocrisy vis-a-vis equality values, but they also reveal differences in the application of rights to different groups equality inconsistency. The next analyses examined group rights, group equality, and social distance judgments to establish whether there were systematic statistical differences between different target groups i.
We hypothesized that participants would place greater importance on equality for paternalized groups women, people over 70, and disabled people than for non-paternalized groups Muslims, Black people, and homosexuals. Importantly, consistent with our hypothesis a planned comparison between the three paternalized and three nonpaternalized groups showed a highly significant difference.
Because advocacy of equal employment opportunity for different pairs of groups was measured in different versions of the survey, we analyzed these judgments using a 2 Type of Group: Paternalized, Nonpaternalized X 3 Version: A [women, homosexuals], B [people over 70, Muslims], C [disabled, Black people] mixed analysis of variance ANOVA with survey version as a between participants factor. A plausible reason for equality hypocrisy across the population as a whole might be that those who more strongly value equality for all will indeed espouse greater equality for any particular group.
Those who value equality less may express more divergent views about the importance of equality for different groups. To test this idea we divided the sample according to whether their general equality value scores were at the midpoint or below not valuing equality or above the midpoint valuing equality.
The Left’s Hypocrisy On Race Rhetoric
We then examined the scores on dependent variables for the paternalized versus nonpaternal-ized groups. We examined responses to three dependent variables, group rights, group. Low and Target Group Paternalized vs. Nonpaternalized on Group-Specific Measures of Equality. Group rights 4. The pattern is consistent across dependent variables. Respondents who valued equality more highly did indeed advocate higher group rights, group equality, and desire less social distance for each specific group.
However, even though these respondents valued equality highly, they significantly favored paternalized groups over nonpa-ternalized groups, meaning that equality hypocrisy persists. To examine the predictive effects of individual differences in motivation to control prejudice and equality value on equality inconsistency we computed within-person variance scores from ratings of paternalized and nonpa-ternalized groups. For the group rights variable we were able to compute variance using ratings of all six target groups.
For the group equality and the social distance variables the variances were computed using the target pair in the relevant survey version i. Whether or not version was controlled for by creating two dummy variables made no difference to the findings. Because these scores tap within-respondent variance in judgments about the different groups, higher scores reflect greater inconsistency.
We hypothesized that internal motivation to control prejudice should be associated with lower equality variance. Second, given that survey responses were observable by the inter-. Therefore, equality value and both types of motivation to control prejudice should be associated with lower equality variance. In principle, if all three are high, there should be no equality variance because someone who values equality for all, and who does not wish to be or be seen to be prejudiced should view the rights and equality of all groups as equally important.
We also propose, therefore, that equality variance should be maximized if equality value and both types of motivation to control prejudice are all low. To test whether internal and external motivation to control prejudice moderated the relationship between general equality values and equality variances for each measure, we used Hayes' PROCESS macro Model 3 for multiple moderation.
In separate analyses of the within-person variance of each dependent variable group rights, group equality, social distance , equality value was the independent variable and internal and external control were separate moderators. Simple slopes analyses Model 1 were conducted to probe the Equality Value X Internal Motivation to control prejudice interaction. External motivation to control prejudice was also retained in the model and entered as a covariate.
Figure 2. Low and high refer to values 1 standard deviation below and above the variable's mean, respectively. To summarize the overall pattern, we note two points. First, the variance was greatest when equality value, internal motivation, and external motivation were all low. Variance was smallest when equality and internal motivation was high but external motivation was low. Second, the relationship between levels of equality and variance was strongest when both internal and external motivations were low and smallest when both were high.
To summarize the overall pattern, the variance was large when equality value, internal motivation, and external motivation were all low. Variance was smallest if any one of these variables was high. The relationship between levels of equality and variance was stronger when both internal and external motivation were low than when either were high see Figure 3. Figure 3. Simple slopes analysis Model 1 with external motivation entered as a covariate revealed that equality value. Figure 4.
In summary, as with group equality, the variance in social distance was large when equality value, internal motivation, and external motivation were all low. Variance was smaller when any one of these variables was high. The relationship between levels of equality and variance was stronger when both internal and external motivation were low than when either were high. Can a society in which a large majority claims to value the human right of equality for all regard itself as meeting the requirements of Article 1 in the UDHR?
From this study of the United Kingdom during one of its more liberal eras, the answer appears to be that espousing the general value of equality is not sufficient. The present research exposes clear evidence of equality hypocrisy because people were less willing to endorse equal rights for specific groups than they were for all groups.
Moreover, this hypocrisy was manifested both at the aggregate level characterizing society as a whole see Figure 1 , and within individuals who chose to prioritize the equal rights of particular groups more than other groups showing equality inconsistency. Whereas previous research has highlighted the potential mismatch between overall human rights support and application to specific groups e.
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Arguably, this is a stronger test of equality hypocrisy as it determines whether people do apply the principle of equality equally across different types of minority. Our findings showed clear support for the existence of equality hypocrisy. Specifically, respondents advocated equality as a value more strongly than they advocated equality for nonpa-ternalized minority groups.
They also judged the rights of some groups to be more important than the rights of others. We proposed that differences in the application of equality to different groups would reflect differences in paternalistic stereotypes associated with each group Fiske et al. In particular, we expected that because paternalized groups pose little threat to the status or power of other groups, respondents would be more willing to grant equality to those groups than to nonpater-nalized groups.
Specifically, we proposed and found that respondents advocated equality more strongly for women, older people and disabled people, than for Blacks, Muslims and homosexual people. Importantly, differential equality in favor of paternalized groups occurred regardless of whether respondents were asked to consider all six of these groups or whether they were asked to consider one of three different pairings of the groups.
This evidence suggests strongly that equality inconsistency in favor of paternalized groups is not an artifact of demand characteristics or measurement procedures, but is a robust effect. We then pursued the question of why equality inconsistency between paternalized and nonpa-ternalized groups exists and whether it shares a common basis with intergroup prejudice. We reasoned that people who value universal equality more highly should be more consistent in their application of equality across different groups.
In addition, prior research has established that people may moderate their expressions of prejudice depending on both their per-. If application of equality values is related to intergroup prejudice then these two motivations should also result in greater consistency in the application of equality across specific groups. However, we could not be sure whether equality values would subsume prejudice motivations, whether these different motives and values would have independent additive effects or whether they would interact.
As far as we are aware this issue has not been explored in previous research. Across different measures, the results showed that the motivations to control prejudice and equality values had interactive effects. Either high equality value or high internal motivations to control prejudice were sufficient to reduce inconsistency in judgments of the rights of different groups. Similarly, consistency in social distance prejudice responses was greater if either equality value or internal motivation to control prejudice were high, than if both were low.
We note that the main effect of external motivation to control prejudice differed across measures. Future research may need to consider why this might be. Taken together, these findings are both encouraging and concerning. It is encouraging that we have identified three possible ways to promote greater application of Article 1 of the UHDR. One is to simply reinforce the basic value of equality. Another is to promote motivation to be unprejudiced, and the third may be to reinforce the idea that being seen to be prejudiced is highly undesirable. The latter strategy implies that people may in fact remain prejudiced, but simply not show this publicly.
However, reducing public prejudice may have beneficial indirect effects through changing social norms cf. Aronson, ; Berkowitz, Less encouraging is the persistence of significant equality inconsistency even among people who we might expect to show none. Specifically, even those who most highly valued equality showed equality inconsistency. We believe that this reflects the pervasiveness and power of societal intergroup relations and stereotypes, and indicates a need for future research to explore ways to break the social and psychological barriers in the treatment of these different kinds of groups.
Our findings suggest that it may be helpful if equality and diversity training can. The findings also highlight the importance of incorporating an intergroup relations perspective within equality and diversity training. Rokeach's classic studies asked participants to rank a number of values, among which were equality and freedom. Freedom was usually ranked high, and equality rather low, which served as the main point given in the feedback, whereby Rokeach drew people's attention to the wide discrepancy in valuation of freedom and equality.
Rokeach surmised that participants would be dissatisfied with this discrepancy, which would lead them to change their values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. It would be interesting and promising to apply this self-confrontation technique to equality inconsistency. Based on intergroup relations theories, we proposed that equality hypocrisy and equality inconsistency could arise for several reasons. We tested these questions in a social and political policy context that was actively promoting equality, and that was engaged with the goal of protecting and advocating human rights.
One of the coalition's earliest acts was to cut the budget and size of the Equality and Human Rights Commission dramatically. The coalition government launched sustained criticism of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and bemoaned the imposition of undue "political correctness" from outside the United Kingdom. In this rhetoric a sustained theme has been that of undeserving groups those espousing different values, foreigners stealing British jobs, welfare scroungers, feckless youth, and so on.
Politicians have argued that equal rights should only be granted to these groups if they assume equal "responsibilities" an economic and structural impossibility. We consider that the success of these rhetorical strategies lies in their capacity to activate intergroup motives and to drive a wedge between the rights of minority status groups that are paternalized versus nonpaternalized. Narratives that contrast the deserving and undeserving groups or subgroups among the poor, immigrants, etc. Paternalistic prejudice can ostensibly demonstrate tolerance and consideration of human rights, while nonpaternalistic prejudices demonstrate defense of ingroup values and freedoms.
Yet, in this type of rhetoric, support for minorities is conditional on their posing no threat and remaining dependent, while denial of rights to nonpaternalized minorities is justified with more overtly "hostile" forms of prejudice that focus on the threats to ingroup culture, economy or security posed by such groups.
The present research has several limitations. One is that we did not use identical response scales to measure equality value and equality judgments relating to specific groups. We are aware that it is preferable to use multiple items to measure constructs in psychological research. Single items are likely to yield smaller effects and this may account for some of the small effect sizes in the present research. However, the advantage of a very large representative sample and the use of pretested items that are representative of particular constructs is that what is lost in measurement error is partially compensated for in statistical power.
The social relevance and gener-alizability of our findings are greatly enhanced by use of a large and nationally representative sample, but we recognize that additional experimental research could help to explore the relevant processes and mechanisms in greater detail. An empirical limitation is that the research was conducted only in one cultural setting. Kymlicka argues that whereas Western cultures can ideologically accommodate both individual freedom and group rights under the umbrella of "equality," the same is not true in all cultures.
Notwithstanding that caveat, we have several reasons for believing that the findings and general processes at work will generalize, at least to most Western cultures. First, there was some cultural heterogeneity within our national sample, and the findings emerged when multiple demographic variables were accounted for as covariates.
Second, the general phenomenon of equality hypocrisy, which we observed across different types of group, echoes the findings from other cultural contexts that inconsistency exists between general equality values and application to a single minority. Therefore, even if the particular groups that are more pa-ternalized differ between cultures, we would still expect that people would more willingly endorse equality for paternalized groups. Related to this question is whether there are important nuances and differences in equality hypocrisy as applied to nonpaternalized groups, and particularly whether there are situations in which they can attract perceptions of being highly competent without also posing a threat to majority groups.
There are several other interesting avenues for future research. One would be to investigate how other values articulate with group motives, and how moral principles may be strategically incorporated into group-based judgments cf. Another is to test whether equality inconsistency can be reduced by priming specific motives and values cf.
But the police and protesters alike could only wonder what might truly account for such a level of atrocity. The police quoted the main suspect — Micah Johnson, a black Army veteran with service in Afghanistan, who was killed after being cornered — as intent on killing white people and avenging the innocent deaths of black citizens in police encounters elsewhere. The suspect said himself what it was: racism, anger, and a spirit of vengeance — as the Times notes in the very next sentence! While the precise motivation for the rampage remains unclear, it is evident that Mr.
Mateen was driven by hatred toward gays and lesbians. They occur where bigotry is allowed to fester, where minorities are vilified and where people are scapegoated for political gain. Tragically, this is the state of American politics, driven too often by Republican politicians who see prejudice as something to exploit, not extinguish. Mateen slaughtered those gay people in the name of a terrorist organization that routinely executes suspected homosexuals by throwing them from tall buildings.
The Times editorial board, like Black Lives Matter, engaged in a vicious, disgusting smear of the people it hates. This is particularly galling when one thinks about the way the left, broadly, has busied itself policing speech on campuses, treating so-called microaggressions as if they were war crimes. Those bullies deserve a taste of their own medicine. As for the Times , hey Liz Spayd, the new public editor, what say you about this double standard on the editorial page?
The ugly truth is that too many people on both the left and the right are being completely irresponsible with their rhetoric, stoking the flames of race hatred. It feels good to hate with everything in you. Rod Dreher E-mail Rod Follow roddreher.