- Joint Publication Joint Operation Planning
- Joint Publication JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning 11 August 2011
- joint operation planning
- Joint Publication 5-0. Joint Operation Planning
By William M. Ramsey Features. By Todd R. By Michael S. Tucker and Robert W. By Charles D. By Wilson T. VornDick Recall. By Alan Gropman. By Francis P. By Todd M.
Manyx Joint Doctrine. By William O. Odom and Christopher D. Assorted publications and joint doctrine have evolved to incorporate Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational JIIM organizations into the military planning process. Including these actors is a major thrust of joint doctrine including JP , Joint Operation Planning , yet we fall short when planning meets execution. It is only when JIIM partners are fully synchronized in both planning and execution that we will realize the desired comprehensive effects.
However, the current edition of JP , Joint Targeting , neglects to adequately address all the JIIM considerations required to synchronize activities and needs further revision. Consider two scenarios. The International Security Assistance Force ISAF and international community decide to more effectively and efficiently organize their resources and activities to tackle the Afghan opium trade, leading to a significant reduction in opium production.
At the same time, a U. Army brigade defeats an insurgent cell in Kandahar City without firing a single shot. While Joint Publication JP , Joint Targeting , dated January 31, , provides a rather comprehensive approach to targeting, it does not adequately address all the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational JIIM considerations required to synchronize activities and achieve desired effects. JP requires further refinement as it fails to guide either commanders or staffs to examine the process for adequately including nonlethal activities and interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational capabilities.
Joint doctrine is the body of basic principles that guide the employment of U. Government agencies. In addition, joint doctrine rightfully acknowledges that achieving national strategic, theater strategic, and operational desired conditions requires more than just military instruments of national power. Indeed, as clearly expressed in JP , Joint Operation Planning , during Phase 0 shape the environment the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power have primacy, with military support in activities such as military-to-military engagements and foreign internal defense FID training.
While military activities typically have precedence during Phases I, II, and III deter the enemy, seize the initiative, and dominate the enemy , primacy reverts to the other instruments of national power in Phases IV and V stabilize the environment and enable civil authority. Critically, stakeholders will achieve greater and more enduring effects by coordinating and synchronizing military and nonmilitary efforts throughout all phases. Since joint doctrine has evolved to incorporate interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational actors into military plans and operations, but it still fails to address how best to involve all JIIM partners in targeting.
A quick review of current joint doctrine illustrates this point. Comparing the instances of the use of the word interagency in joint publications, the disparity between planning and executing JIIM activities becomes evident see table 1. It outlines how the joint force commander should apply joint functions to joint targeting and describes how consensus building among JIIM partners is essential to meeting both national and strategic objectives. The resulting unity of effort creates a commonality of purpose between the military and the other instruments of national power.
JP , Joint Operations , discusses the importance of synchronizing plans and operations with interagency, intergovernmental, multinational, and partner entities, but it too fails to address fully how these parties should be included in targeting or focused operations to achieve desired effects throughout a joint campaign. On the other hand, JP , Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations , provides both guidance and best practices for conducting either interorganizational or interagency coordination to achieve unity of effort and common understanding and to ensure a whole-of-government approach toward joint operations.
Joint Publication Joint Operation Planning
Current doctrine encourages military targeting to achieve military objectives with a subsequent coordination in the JIACG. The current JP defines targeting thusly:. While this description appears to suggest targeting as a comprehensive, systematic, and inclusive process, a closer examination of the document reveals that interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational considerations receive little attention. Instead, it mostly describes how these organizations can inform the intelligence and assessment processes the joint force commander uses when developing targeting plans.
It does not illustrate how these same organizations inform the planning and execution of targeting operations. A further comparison within JP provides a similar narrative regarding the terms lethal and nonlethal. The word lethal appears 30 times while nonlethal appears 41 times. Based on this simple examination of the document, one could conclude that the two activities earn roughly equal discussions, but a more thorough inspection indicates otherwise.
Of the 41 nonlethal entries, 7 are about nonlethal weapons while 12 30 percent occur on just two pages II and II JP wisely includes examples to help commanders better understand the targeting process. However, all four examples discuss only lethal activities to attack enemy capabilities destroying enemy air defenses; disrupting the enemy petroleum, oil, and lubrication infrastructure; defeating the enemy air force; and destroying two bridges. Joint targeting doctrine has certainly matured over the last decade to capture the real-world experiences of commanders and staffs continuously operating jointly.
However, it does not yet recognize the full potential of all the JIIM actors during conflict. Similar to Phase 0, these latter phases require even greater coordination and synchronization with interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners as demands for their unique capabilities grow.
Joint Publication JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning 11 August 2011
The following offers an updated model for joint targeting, which all JIIM actors can easily use across the range of military operations. Considering the numerous joint activities across the range of military operations during all phases, only a small fraction pertains to killing the enemy. Currently, however, JP heavily emphasizes lethal employment and is disproportionately enemy-focused.
Therefore, the first step to creating a more expansive cognitive model of targeting is to erase the terms lethal and nonlethal from the lexicon since they confuse analysis and encourage stovepipe thinking. Organizing the targeting staff into lethal and nonlethal cells, as is common, decreases effectiveness and efficiency because of the duality of effort and high probability that the efforts themselves could become desynchronized.
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In some cases, an additional [Joint Targeting Working Group] may be required to process, deconflict, and prioritize all nominated targets. In reality, most SFA and FID involves teaching logistics, command and control, and the staff functions necessary to recruit, man, train, equip, and sustain host nation security forces—hardly lethal. This inherently decreases efficiency as it stovepipes information, creates unnecessary hindrances to information flow among staff sections, and all but eliminates synergistic effects among targeting cells.
Rather, individual targeting cells focus on distinct problems and the application of distinct lethal or nonlethal activities. Instead of synchronizing efforts after the fact, we recommend a single targeting cell and single targeting approach. Such an approach is more efficient, more comprehensive, provides greater synergy, better synchronizes activities resource allocation, and organizationally requires a smaller staff. Chief engineer discusses power line construction with Kabul Electricity Directorate engineering liaison and U.
Targeting is the process of addressing the strategic factors that prevent progress from current to desired conditions. The strategic factors will vary across OEs but might include challenges and opportunities such as corruption, security sector capacity, black market economies, resource scarcity, ethnic conflict, and urbanization. A line of effort is a conceptual category that allows an organization to unify the efforts of all participants toward a common purpose.
Usually LOEs are closely related but need not be sequential in nature.
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Just as commanders must routinely adjust task organization to meet environmental and operational changes, they must also consider staff changes to ensure the appropriate integration of JIIM partners throughout all phases of an operation. As noted above, many joint force organizations at strategic through tactical levels have reflexively split their targeting staffs into lethal and nonlethal cells. The commander should overcome this divide by organizing the staff around the various lines of effort. Because doctrine cannot anticipate every LOE for which an organization might operate, it cannot prescribe the staff organization that is optimal for every scenario.
The commander or his designated representative should consider individual skills and attributes more than Service, branch, or rank. Traditional training and professional military education are often insufficient to produce the skills and attributes that yield excellence in analysis and planning along a nontraditional line of effort.
Officers and senior noncommissioned officers with unique experiences or education may generate the best ideas. Indeed, each cell will require officers and senior noncommissioned officers who fully understand their targeting roles and how the process contributes to operational success. In a complex and dynamic JIIM environment, finding the right person for the right position will rely on intuition and judgment that can only be marginally informed by traditional staff structures and grade plates.
Organizing the staff into LOE cells with the right people does not guarantee the staff will overcome the stovepiping tendency. Once the correct cells have been established, they must coordinate their efforts and provide input into other working groups WGs. Our recommended staff targeting process is designed to develop synergy across the staff to produce fully integrated operations. Additionally, this recommendation provides an institutional access point and incentive for our interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to participate since it improves communication among stakeholders, provides a venue for positions to be heard, and ensures that initiatives are better conceived, integrated, and synchronized.
Physical organization of the staff is just the beginning; inevitably the people who form the staff will separate into various working groups to address the problems at hand. Working groups and boards exist in doctrine and in many headquarters to address the first two steps of the targeting process: assess the OE to identify strategic factors, and develop COAs to overcome the factors. However, little practical or applicable work is accomplished within the groups; rather, in practice, the staff sections often work independently of one another outside the respective working group meetings to identify challenges and concomitant solutions.
Hence, working group meetings often become merely informational briefings. Staffs must avoid this tendency. Effective JIIM organizations will establish an environment in which the staff purposefully discusses ideas at the working groups. Effective JIIM targeting requires a battle rhythm event specifically dedicating time for the staff to focus on the OE and the targeting process.
joint operation planning
Given the operational environment is not simple or static, adaptation and flexibility are necessary in planning and execution. This edition of JP seeks to arm joint force commanders with processes that allow for that flexibility. I encourage leaders to ensure their organizations understand and use joint doctrine and this manual in particular as you continue to assist our Nation in advancing its enduring interests.
See All Customer Reviews. Shop Books. Add to Wishlist. USD Sign in to Purchase Instantly. Overview This edition of Joint Publication JP , Joint Operation Planning, reflects the current doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the full range of military operations.
Joint Publication 5-0. Joint Operation Planning
This keystone publication forms the core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces' ability to fight as a joint team. Product Details. Average Review. Write a Review. Related Searches. Joint Operation Planning: 11 August Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders CCDRs and their subordinate joint force commanders JFCs in response to contingencies and crises.